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How do we go about coming to conclusions about ethical issues? We
always employ some kind of ethical reasoning. It is also the case that ethi-
cal reasoning alone will not generate conclusions about particular ethical
dilemmas. We need some other kind of premises as well. For example, if I
wonder whether I am obligated to give you $10.00, I need more than the
ethical premise, “One ought to pay one’s debts.” In this case, I also need a
bit of empirical knowledge. I need the knowledge that I borrowed $10.00
from you previously. If we combine the right ethical claim and the empiri-
cal knowledge, we can generate an ethical conclusion that I am (at least
prima facie) obligated to give you $10.00.
Metaphysics and Ethical Disputes
Some philosophers have argued that there are ethical issues that require
more than the combination of ethical principles and empirical knowledge.
For some issues, especially issues concerning ethics at the beginning and at
the end of life, metaphysical considerations are thought also to be impor-
tant. Not every philosopher, however, thinks that metaphysics plays a
large role in these issues. For example, in a recent issue of this journal,
Kevin Corcoran has argued that it is not the metaphysical theory one holds
about the nature of human persons that will determine the outcome of the
sort of ethical questions about the beginning and the end of life.1
Specifically, he argues that whether one holds to a constitution view, an
animalist view, or a substance dualist view of human persons, issues such
as the morality of abortion or of various kinds of euthanasia will be decid-
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In a recent issue of this journal, Kevin Corcoran has argued that the meta-
physical theory one holds to about the nature of human persons is irrele-
vant to the sort of ethical questions that occupy bioethicists as well as the
general public. Specifically, he argues that whether one holds a constitution
view of human persons, an animalist view, or a substance dualist view, the
real work in one’s ethical reasoning is done by certain moral principles
rather than by metaphysical ones. I raise objections to his analysis and pro-
pose that it is a combination of ethical principles and metaphysical princi-
ples that does the work in our judgements about the morality of abortion
and other actions.
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ed more by one’s ethical principles than by one’s metaphysical theory. 
The foil for Corcoran’s discussion is the recent book by JP Moreland and
Scott Rae, Body and Soul: Human Nature and the Crisis in Ethics.2 Moreland
and Rae think that it is metaphysics that is crucial for the central ethical
issues of the day such as abortion, euthanasia and cloning.  The project of
their book is not to argue directly for the connection between metaphysics
and ethics. It is to argue, first, that a Thomistic version of dualism is the
best metaphysical view of the human person and, second, that this kind of
dualism provides the surest ground for the protection of human beings at
the boundaries of life. 
Corcoran claims that Moreland and Rae never actually argue that the
metaphysics of personhood is crucial to the ethical debates. Rather, they
proceed under the assumption that personhood is the central issue.
Corcoran reconstructs their line of thinking as trading on the following
central premise: “If some human organism fails to instantiate the property
of being a person, then that organism lacks a moral status sufficient for
generating moral obligations or moral expectations to protect its life.”
(220). They argue that Naturalistic and “Christian Complimentarian”
views of the person are not sufficient because they entail that some human
beings are not human persons.  Moreland and Rae, according to Corcoran,
do not give us any reason to accept their central premise.
Corcoran’s main criticism is to point out that it is never the metaphysical
position that is doing the real work in these ethical debates. Rather, it is
some ethical principle that is employed in combination with the meta-
physics that does the work. He writes:
In this paper I acknowledge that naturalist views of human persons
like animalism and CV [the Constitution View] fail to provide meta-
physical resources necessary or sufficient for generating moral oblig-
ations or moral expectations to protect the life of the human fetus or
PVS patient [patient in a Persistent Vegetative State]. I point out,
however, that any metaphysical view of persons, be that metaphysic
dualist or naturalist in nature, is impotent to provide such resources.
I argue that other resources, metaphysically neutral with respect to
dualism and naturalism, must be added to such views in order to
generate moral obligations or moral expectations to protect human
life. (219)
What Corcoran means by the impotence of a metaphysical view of per-
sons can be illustrated when we see that someone can hold that the human
fetus is a human person and still be pro-abortion. This combination is
coherent if one holds that there are moral grounds for taking another
human person’s life and that abortion is or can be justified by those
grounds. Conversely, one can also hold that the human fetus is not a per-
son and still be anti-abortion. Corcoran offers the following ethical princi-
ple as being sufficient to protect the unborn fetus. “[E]very human fetus is
created by God with the ultimate intention of coming to constitute a per-
son and on the basis of God’s ultimately good intentions for it the life of
the fetus ought to be protected.” (223)  If one’s  ethic is grounded in God’s
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intentions one can protect the fetus without believing it to be a person. For
each metaphysical position about persons one might hold, then, a variety
of ethical positions are possible. 
So far as this line of criticism is concerned, I think Corcoran is mostly
right. It is true that the ethical position you hold about abortion will not
depend on your metaphysics alone. Any metaphysical position about the
personhood of the human fetus or about the nature of human persons in
general can be held by either side of some ethical dispute as long as the
right kind of ethical principles are deployed. So long as your ethical princi-
ples are sufficiently accommodating, you can hold any metaphysical view
you want and still not hold views considered to be morally suspect. You
can hold that dogs are metaphysically inferior to human beings but, armed
with the ethical principle that any sentient being ought to be granted equal
consideration and protection, you will protect dogs to exactly the same
degree that you will protect human beings. Conversely, you can have an
egalitarian metaphysics of sentient beings and still give strongly preferen-
tial treatment to human beings so long as your ethical principle allows you
to distinguish between sentient beings that have rights to protection and
those that do not. 
I am not suggesting that these strange combinations are the inevitable
outcome of a position like Corcoran’s, or that he endorses such maneuvers.
Such possibilities are instructive because Corcoran’s major point is, I think,
largely correct.  It is possible to hold any metaphysical view at all and still
get all the “right” answers on whatever ethical quiz you take if your ethical
principles are carefully constructed. Clearly it is the combination of your
metaphysics and your ethical principles that carries the day.
So how exactly does metaphysics play a role in ethical conclusions? I
want to make two points, here. Consider a fairly obvious ethical principle:
It is morally wrong to torture an innocent person to death just for fun. In what
ways will metaphysics have a bearing on arguments that build on this
principle? Metaphysics helps us sort out which things fall into the category
of person and which things do not. An ethical principle such as We have a
moral obligation to protect important works of art does not require a meta-
physics of persons for its application. It may require a metaphysics of art.
A principle such as One ought to pay one’s debts may require very little by
way of metaphysics.
The second point is that it is not the details of one’s metaphysical theory
that makes the difference in supporting an ethical conclusion. There are
many different but incompatible positions about the metaphysics of per-
sons that grant the human fetus personhood (as there are many different
but incompatible theories that do not.) So far as some of the standard argu-
ments for or against abortion are concerned, these theories are on a par.
They each sort out persons from non-persons in a way that lands human
fetuses on one side rather than the other. 
So I am not prepared to concede that your metaphysical view is impotent
in this regard. Sometimes your metaphysics will have to do quite a bit of
work. Suppose you hold that you ought not torture an innocent person to
death. This is an ethical principle that will not require much argumenta-
tion. If you seek to outlaw the fur industry based on this principle, your
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metaphysics will have to do a lot of work. You will have to argue that
weasels, minks and skunks are persons in the relevant sense and that har-
vesting them for fur is a form of torture.3 My point is that either your ethi-
cal principle or your metaphysics will be doing the lion’s share of the work
depending upon which is more obvious than the other. In the fur case, it is
not obvious that minks are persons, so you will have to have strong meta-
physical arguments to support your ethical conclusion.
Neither your metaphysical view nor your ethical principles by them-
selves determine that outcome of an ethical issue. So, let us agree that it is a
combination of principles (ethical, metaphysical and empirical) that is
required to ground our ethical judgements about abortion and the like. We
will call this thesis the combination thesis. I want to ask three questions with
this thesis in mind and then raise one objection to Corcoran’s treatment of
abortion and the death of a person.
Three Questions
1. Do Moreland and Rae fail to grasp the combination thesis?
We can wonder whether Moreland and Rae’s approach is vitiated by their
ignoring the combination thesis. They certainly claim repeatedly that meta-
physics of person is crucial for the ethical debates they discuss.4 I think
that they do not actually ignore the thesis. Rather they assume it, and they
assume that most of the relevant ethical principles that are both plausible
and culturally embedded will trade on the distinction between persons
and non-persons. They do not argue for this directly but they do show
how many in these debates frame their arguments around the question of
personhood. The abortion arguments, for example, are presented in terms
of ethical principles such as the claim that a woman has a right to do what
she wants with her body. Moreland and Rae point out that without a meta-
physical view that the fetus is not a person, such arguments are not suc-
cessful. So in working with the actual ethical arguments, they show their
awareness that it is a combination of ethics and metaphysics that makes
the arguments work.
2. Are moral obligations all or nothing affairs?
Corcoran implies that Moreland and Rae think moral obligations are all or
nothing affairs. The sentence he uses to capture their central premise
makes this claim clear.  “If some human organism fails to instantiate the
property of being a person, then that organism lacks a moral status suffi-
cient for generating moral obligations or moral expectations to protect its
life.” (220). If a position does not protect the fetus to the same degree that it
protects a fully functioning normal adult, then it offers no protection at all.
I do not think Moreland and Rae hold this view. The question of what con-
stitutes adequate protection is one that gets its bite from moral dilemmas.
It is relatively easy to have an ethic that protects a fetus or a dog or a city
park. The difficult questions come in when prima facie obligations come
into conflict with other prima facie obligations. Do we keep the park or
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build adequate housing for the inhabitants of the city? Ethical dilemmas
involve the tug of competing claims. Which of the claimants deserves
greater consideration and protection? Perhaps we can shed more light on
the discussion by talking of a combination of ethics and metaphysics offer-
ing degrees of protection rather than either offering protection or failing to
offer protection.
I think the reason that the issue of personhood has been and continues
to be central is that when ethical principles conflict, the lesser obligation
gives way to the greater. Any combination of ethics and metaphysics that
protects the unborn fetus while claiming that it is not a human person will
give way to the greater demands of personhood somewhere along the line.
So Corcoran’s principle, that God’s intention for the fetus warrants its pro-
tection, will work fine as long as there are no conflicts between the protec-
tion of the fetus and other values. A similar principle may protect the lives
of dogs. Dogs are created by God and are sentient and have a significant
degree of intelligence. They ought to be protected, all things being equal.
There are cases in which it is perfectly fine to kill a dog, however. The
degree to which a dog must be protected is much less than the degree to
which a human person is to be protected.
We ought to note that the presumption in the abortion debate has often
been that the obligation to protect the human fetus will give way to other
obligations unless the fetus has the highest metaphysical status that is pos-
sible for it and, therefore, the right to the highest degree of protection.
Unless it is a person, the presumption is that other considerations trump
the rights of the fetus. Whether this presumption is justified or not, it
demonstrates that it is in the meeting of conflicting obligations that the
contribution of metaphysical views is critical.
Moreland and Rae have discerned the widespread assumption that it is
personhood that will be decisive for the abortion debate. They would not
claim that any view that holds that the fetus is not a person would auto-
matically be a position that supports abortion. They do recognize that a
“door is opened” in that the protection of the fetus will go only so far if it is
less than a person.
3. To what degree should our metaphysics answer to our ethical theories?
Is it legitimate to argue from an ethical position to a metaphysical one? I do
not know. Sometimes I think that to do so is to walk backwards. It might
be fun for a while but it is easy to lose your perspective and your balance.
Our metaphysics ought to come first and our ethics ought to be built with
our metaphysics in mind. This order is the order of reality. The order of
knowing, however, may be different. I may be more sure of a certain ethi-
cal position than I am of a metaphysical one. For example, I am more sure
that persons have intrinsic value and that it is wrong to torture a baby to
death just for fun than I am that dualism or incompatibilism is true. In such
a situation it ought to be legitimate to use our ethical thinking to help us
come to our metaphysical position. In fact, one of the reasons I am a liber-
tarian about human freedom is that I have great difficulty making sense of
moral obligations otherwise. Perhaps if one is convinced that abortion is
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morally wrong, and one wrestles with the arguments Moreland and Rae
present, one will be drawn to a dualist position.
Abortion and the Death of a Person
Corcoran raises the interesting objection to dualism to the effect that, on
dualism, no abortion ends the life of any person (222). Since a person sur-
vives the death of her body, when a fetus dies, there is no person who ceas-
es to exist. If abortion does not end the life of a person, then our reasons for
opposing it must be grounded in some ethical prohibition other than one
prohibiting the ending of a person’s life.
I find this to be a very interesting objection. First we  must note that this
line of thought is not limited to fetuses. If dualism is true, no murder caus-
es a person to cease to exist. Second, this consequence holds not only for
dualists but for anyone who holds to anything near to the orthodox view
of the afterlife. Whether the dualist or the constitution-theorist is correct,
we hold it to be the case that no person ceases to exist at death.
I think we can still hold that, in some sense, death ends the life of the
person. It certainly ends the earthly life of the person. So too on a dualist
view of the fetus. An abortion ends the earthly life of the fetus. Clearly the
scriptural prohibitions against murder are not based on the idea that to kill
someone is to cause them to cease to exist. To kill is to end the earthly life
of a person. The earthly life itself has value - but it is not the only value nor
the highest value. Perhaps this is why there are things that are worse than
death.5
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NOTES
1. “Material Persons, Immaterial Souls and an Ethic of Life,” Faith and
Philosophy 20 (2003) 218-228. This article will be cited parenthetically.
2. J. P. Moreland and Scott B Rae, Body and Soul: Human Nature and the
Crisis in Ethics Downers Grove, IL: Inter Varsity Press, 2000.
3. The claim that harvesting a mink for fur is a form of torture is an empir-
ical claim. So this case involves some significant empirical claims as well as the
ethical principles and metaphysical positions. Empirical knowledge is required
to be confident that certain actions are to be counted as belonging to the rele-
vant ethical sort. Sometimes empirical knowledge is relevant also to the claim
that certain beings are to be counted as counting as the relevant metaphysical
sort. Consider the metaphysical claim that a person is any living thing that
exhibits certain capacities. That a mink or a skunk exhibits these capacities (or
not) is not primarily a metaphysical thesis. It is an empirical one.
4. For example, on one page (236) they make the claim three times: “Our
view of a human person touches virtually every debated issue in biomedical
ethics today...” “The notion of personhood is central not only in reproductive
technologies but also in genetic technologies.” “Finally, the ongoing debate
over physician-assisted suicide (PAS) and euthanasia involve the definition of
a human person.”
5. I wish to thank Kevin Corcoran for comments on this piece and for
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organizing the research group where the preliminary work on this paper took
place. This group was funded by the Calvin Center for Christian Scholarship
and the Council for Christian Colleges and Universities. I wish to thank them
as well. Bill Hasker also gave me very helpful comments on the near final ver-
sion of this essay. 
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